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Abstract
We derive testable implications of Kyle and Obizhaeva’s (2016) notion of “bet invariance”
for the cross-section of trade-time volatilities. We jointly develop theoretical foundations of “no
speculative arbitrage” whose implications incorporate those of bet invariance. Our proposed
test circumvents the unobservable nature of “bets.” Utilizing a large sample of U.S. stocks
post decimilization, we show that using realized volatilities rather than expected volatilities
introduces noise that substantially biases the tests. This leads us to use estimates of normalized
volatilities based on running 24 month windows. We find strong support for no speculative
arbitrage at a moment in time, but not across time.
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1 Introduction
Do speculators compete away abnormal profit opportunities across assets, trading conditions, and
time? With free entry, speculators should be able to allocate resources to information acquisition
in such a way that expected profit opportunities are equated across these dimensions. Our paper
builds on existing market microstructure theories to develop novel predictions that describe how
speculative arbitrage underlies systematic cross-sectional variation in intraday volatilities. We un-
cover strong evidence that arbitrage equalizes expected profit opportunities from speculation across
assets and trading conditions at a moment in time, but not across time.
We build on the analysis of Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016; henceforth, KO) who conjecture a high-
frequency efficiency result, “bet invariance.” KO introduce the notion of dollar risk transfers, or
the expected dollar loss or gain associated with implementing a bet, i.e., a desired change in an
investor’s position in a risky asset.1 The MMI hypothesis treats bets as random variables featuring
asset- and time-specific probability distributions. KO hypothesize that in a trading environment
with minimal market microstructure frictions, choices of potentially-informed speculators should
lead to an invariant distribution of dollar risk transfers over time and across assets. Otherwise,
speculators could re-allocate resources to assets representing greater expected profit opportunities.2
Our paper derives and implements testable implications of bet invariance for the cross-section
of volatility that rely only on publicly-available data. These implications hold under weaker iden-
tifying assumptions than those required by existing tests. We also develop an intuitive theory, “no
speculative arbitrage,” that produces the same predictions in this context as KO’s “bet invariance.”
We test these implications using a large sample of liquid U.S. stocks post decimilization. Our test is
unique in that it relies only on standard trading data, exploiting cross-sectional variation in volatil-
ity. We show that bet invariance is satisfied only when using expected volatility as an input, rather
than realized spot volatility. We argue that is because speculators equate profit opportunities in
1More generally, a bet can refer to an aggregate measure of all intended positions to be taken (or left) based on
the same piece of positive (negative) information.
2Increased algorithmic and low-latency trading has been found to be associated with improvements in measures
of price efficiency and market quality. See, for example, Hendershott and Riordan (2009), Hasbrouck and Sarr
(2013), O’Hara et al. (2014), Conrad et al. (2015), and Hendershott and Riordan (2009).
1
expectation, whereas the actual outcomes are stochastic.
Tests of invariance confront two fundamental challenges. First, invariance represents a restric-
tion on dollar risk transfers of bets, which are intrinsically unobservable. Existing tests do not
circumvent this unobservability, with the consequence that their applicability is limited to a few
particular settings. For example, KO use proprietary data on trades by (non-strategic) portfolio
transition specialists, whose bets they argue are plausibly observable. Our test takes observable
total volatility measures as inputs, directly addressing the unobservability of bet risk transfers.
The second challenge that existing tests must confront is that using observable volatilities re-
quires a set of strong auxiliary assumptions. In particular, they must assume that the arrival rate
of bets does not vary across different public information environments, e.g, times of the trading
day; and they must assume that the bet-to-total volume and volatility ratios are fixed over time
and across market conditions. These auxiliary assumptions are necessary for single-asset tests be-
cause both total volume and total volatility reflect more than the arrival of speculative bets and
its associated volatility.3 We address this second challenge by expanding the implications of bet
invariance to the cross-section of assets, facilitating normalization of cross-sectional variation with
respect to an arbitrary benchmark asset. This normalization allows for less restrictive assumptions
about variation in bet-to-total volume and volatility over time. In particular, we can accommodate
common cross-stock variation over the trading day and with the level of trading activity.
Our empirical analysis focuses on normalized trade-time volatilities that (i) measure the spot
volatility associated with trading a fixed-dollar value, and (ii) control for well known variation in
volatility across time-of-day, as well as microstructure noise. We define a trade-time interval to
be the time required for realizations of sequences of trades with a month-specific fixed-dollar value
to trade: shorter time durations of trade sequences reflect more active trading conditions, i.e.,
3Andersen et al. (2017) identify a setting where these assumptions may be reasonable. They focus on E-mini
S&P500 futures, where they argue that the substantial depth found at best prices makes it plausible for bets to
be proportional to transactions. With modern equity trading strategies, transactions are far smaller than bets (see
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and O’Hara (2015), among others) for typical stocks, and transaction size
and frequency varies systematically with trading activity and across trading venues. Moreover, reporting systems
differ across trading venues (Upson, Johnson, and McInish (2015)). This means that transaction sizes reported on
the consolidated tape convey different information depending on the venue in which the transaction was executed.
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higher trading activity.4 We therefore define trade-time volatility as the volatility over such trade
sequences.
We first calculate mean trade-time volatilities of each stock in each month by trading condition
(both time-of-day and trading activity level) and then normalize these measures by the corre-
sponding mean trade-time volatility of the median stock. This normalization controls for common
variation in the level of trade-time volatility as well as year-month fixed effects. We establish that
bet invariance implies that the cross-sectional distributions of normalized trade-time volatilities
obtained at different trading conditions should be identical. This means that one can test bet
invariance at a given time-of-day window by regressing the cross-section of normalized trade-time
volatilities obtained at one trading condition on those obtained at any other trading condition.
Invariance predicts that the slope must equal one.
We separately show that the prediction of bet invariance from KO is also implied by a no-
tion that we term “no speculative arbitrage.” This analysis considers speculators who maximize
expected profits from speculation when they identify a profit opportunity and trades have linear
price impacts. We derive the implications of the equilibrium condition that speculators must be
indifferent between profit opportunities across different assets and trading conditions. That is,
the expected profit from investigating one asset rather than another must be the same. Expected
profit opportunities are naturally proportional to volatilities. Adjusting for the arrival rates of such
opportunities and imposing a no-speculative-arbitrage condition, cross-sections of volatility must
be identical across different trading condition environments. When testing at a given time in the
trading day, the identifying assumptions made are only solely that the linear price impact of trade
of stock j in trading condition x at time-of-day d, λjxd, and the arrival rate of profit opportunities,
βjxd, both separably decompose as λjxd = λjλxd and βjxd = βjβxd.
5
An initial regression analysis provides only modest support for either theoretical formulation.
Specifically, the bulk of slope coefficient estimates are economically and statistically less than one:
4This notion of trading activity differs from that in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) in that ours refers to the speed
at which a fixed-dollar value is traded as opposed to the arrival time of (unobservable) bets.
5When we test no speculative arbitrage across times of day, we must impose the more demanding identification
assumptions that λjxd = λjλxλd and βjxd = βjβxβd.
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adjusting type one error for multiple testing, the bet invariance prediction is rejected for over 80%
of the 180 possible activity/time-of-day/portfolio combinations. We find a negative association be-
tween the magnitudes of departures from predicted slope coefficients of one and goodness of fit. This
indicates that departures from bet invariance are likely driven by unexpected variation in volatil-
ity, which biases coefficients downward. These departures are the greatest when the independent
variable in our tests represents a higher activity level than that of the dependent variable.
The no-speculative-arbitrage condition is, from the speculator’s perspective, is an ex-ante con-
cept. That is, speculators allocate resources to acquire information about fundamental values to
compete away ex-ante abnormal profits based on their expected profit opportunities (expected
volatilities). Our initial tests, in contrast, take realized volatilities as inputs. These realized volatil-
ities reflect both expected profit opportunities and unanticipated better or worse realizations of
profits that serve to add noise to the estimates of expected relative profit opportunities. This leads
us to decompose the cross-sectional variation in trade-time volatilities entering the right-hand-side
of our bet invariance regressions into expected vs. unexpected variation. For each stock in each
month, we use the average of its normalized volatilities over the preceding 24 months to measure
expected volatilities, and measure unexpected volatility as the difference between the actual and
expected quantities.
We find strong support for the predictions of bet invariance when we use expected normalized
volatilities as independent variables in our invariance regression tests. With expected volatilities
as RHS variables, we reject predictions of bet invariance less than one-third of the time.6 The
magnitudes of departures are barely related to the goodness of fit. This indicates that we largely
eliminated the idiosyncratic variation in volatility that drove the departures from invariance found
using realized spot volatilities. These results complement findings in KO. They find visual support
for invariance, but their formal statistical tests reject invariance. Such rejections may just reflect
violations of the stronger auxiliary assumptions imposed by their test construction rather than
violations of invariance.
6Moreover, the magnitudes of any departures from bet invariance are greatly reduced.
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Finally, we extend our analysis to test whether bet invariance holds across time-of-day win-
dows. To do this, we require stronger identifying restrictions requiring decompositions of λ and β
by stock, activity level and time of day. When using normalized trade-time volatilities from differ-
ent time-of-day windows as test inputs, estimates are more dispersed and show greater departures
from bet invariance. We find large departures from invariance when comparing early and late times
in the trading day. In particular, for smaller stocks, coefficient estimates substantially exceed one
when the normalized expected volatility on the right-hand side is from late in the trading day and
the dependent variable is from early in the trading day, while estimates are far less than one for
the opposite scenario. This suggests that attenuation bias is unlikely to drive the documented
departures. In sum, we find evidence that speculators equate expected profit opportunities at each
moment of the trading day, but not necessarily across different times in the trading day.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our novel tests of in-
variance, motivates our use of trade-time volatility, and derives the implications of no speculative
arbitrage. Section 3 develops our measure of trade-time volatility, and presents the data. Section 4
presents our findings regarding speculative trading and the cross-section of volatility. Section 5
concludes.
2 Invariance of Risk Transfers and Trade-time Volatility
In this section, we develop a parsimonious test of bet invariance, a fundamental hypothesis under-
lying MMI. Importantly, our test does not require observability of the exact positions, or “bets”,
that investors wish to take. We first briefly describe implications of the theory, highlighting rel-
evant assumptions to our analysis. We then reformulate bet invariance using trade-time return
volatilities, where volatility is measured with respect to a fixed dollar amount traded of a stock.
In doing so, we define the notion of normalized trade-time volatility as the ratio of a stock’s trade-
time volatility to that of a benchmark stock. Our reformulation of bet invariance shows that this
normalized trade-time volatility should have an invariant distribution. We then develop a test, a
regression of normalized trade-time volatility at one trading condition on those at other trading
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conditions, to evaluate bet invariance. We conclude the section by presenting a distinct theoretical
framework of speculative trading where speculators maximize expected profits by choosing bet sizes.
We show that an equilibrium condition that leaves such speculators indifferent between pursuing
profit opportunities across different stocks and trading conditions leads to implications about the
cross-section of volatility that nest those implied by bet invariance.
2.1 Invariance of Bets
To formalize MMI, KO introduce the concepts of bet size and bet arrival rates. As described in
Andersen et al. (2016), an unsigned bet, denoted Q˜jt, is a random variable that captures a trading
decision reflecting a desired change in an investor’s position in security j at time t, in shares. Mul-
tiplying by the asset price Pjt, yields the dollar value, PjtQ˜jt, of this bet. The variable speed at
which bets are placed in the market is translated into a bet arrival rate per unit time, denoted Njt.
When the calendar-time bet volatility is σBjt (in fraction of value per unit time) and the bet arrival
rate per calendar-time interval is Njt, the return volatility per bet (per unit of business time) is
σBjt√
Njt
, presuming that price movements associated with distinct bets are independently distributed.
Multiplying the return volatility per bet by PjtQ˜jt yields the dollar risk transfer associated with
implementing a bet,
I˜jt ≡ PjtQ˜jt
σBjt√
Njt
. (1)
This object represents the dollar gain or loss associated with implementing the bet Q˜jt. Invariance
of bets states that I˜jt has an invariant distribution across stocks and over time, where the source
of random variation in I˜jt is the variation in bet size Q˜jt.
Interpreting bet volatilities as opportunities to make trading profits, the theory requires that
a speculator be indifferent between the potential expected profit opportunities about which she
might acquire information. KO argue that were invariance not to hold between two assets, then
a trader could more profitably acquire information about the asset that faced larger dollar risk
transfers. Essentially, without significant microstructure frictions, traders should compete away
abnormal profit opportunities, leaving dollar risk transfers invariant.
Bet size and bet volatility are intrinsically difficult to measure, creating challenges for tests of
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invariance. Existing empirical analyses sidestep observability concerns in one of two ways: they
either (a) use proprietary data for which the econometrician is privy to the exact bets taken (as
Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) assert holds for their data); or (b) assert that within the particular
market studied, transactions are proportional to underlying bets (as Andersen et al. (2016) argue
holds in the S&P500 E-mini futures market). Our test for invariance of bets addresses this empir-
ical problem. The key feature of our test is that it relies only on the distributional implications of
invariance and not the implicit observability of the primitive bets via observation of transactions.
Our method translates the invariance of dollar risk transfers of unobservable bets into the invariance
of trade-time total return volatility, an intrinsically observable object that we define below. Our
test uses this observable volatility, as opposed to bet volatility, as an input. Because our approach
only relies on the distributional implications of invariance, it enables tests of invariance in a wider
variety of markets, in particular those where the bets themselves are unobservable.
2.2 From Bet Volatility to Total Volatility
We begin by distinguishing unobservable bet volume and bet volatility from observable “total” vol-
ume and “total” volatility, and providing formal links between these notions. Both trading volume
and return volatility are affected by sources other than bet implementation. Fundamentally, trad-
ing volume is the sum of bet volume and other sources of (e.g., intermediary) volume. Similarly,
total return volatility represents aggregate price movements driven by both bet implementation
(bet volatility) and other forces, including public information arrival and market frictions.
In addition to requiring the observability of underlying bets, existing tests of invariance such
as those in KO make the identifying assumption that both the proportions of bet volume to total
volume and bet volatility to total volatility are constant over time and across stocks. Importantly,
our test of invariance relaxes these assumptions. Specifically, our method allows for the proportions
of bet-to-total volume and bet-to-total volatility to vary with bet size quantile. We require only
that this variation maintain a one-to-one mapping from bet volume to total volume and from bet
volatility to total volatility. We exploit these one-to-one mappings to derive the implications of bet
invariance for the cross-sections of total volatility.
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As noted above, existing tests rely on (implicit) observations of bets. Our method translates the
invariance of dollar risk transfers of unobservable bets into the invariance of observable trade-time
total return volatilities, which we define below. Bet invariance implies that for a fixed stock-specific
bet size quantile Q˜
(X)
jt , the respective invariant I˜
(X)
jt (adding bet quantile superscripts to equation
(1), above) is constant in the cross-section of stocks and over time.
We relax this structure in two ways. First, we recognize that the arrival rate of information
or the amount of information for a stock may vary according to public information characteristics.
One can accommodate this formally by imposing a less demanding notion of bet invariance, by
only imposing bet invariance conditional on public information C, where C might, for example,
capture time of day. This weakens the restrictions implied by bet invariance by only requiring
that no speculative arbitrage hold given conditioning information. For example, this allows for the
possibility that speculation opportunities may be better in some public information environments
than in others. This weaker notion only demands that a speculator be indifferent among the avail-
able opportunities. This generalization also facilitates controlling for the feature that bet arrival
rates likely vary with public information. For example, near open, there may be higher rates of
information arrival due to overnight release of information.
Thus, for stocks j and k, at any conditional distribution quantile x, c ∈ (0, 1) (of bet size
Q˜
(X=x|C=c)
jt and Q˜
(X=x|C=c)
kt ),
PjtQ˜
(X=x|C=c)
jt
(
σBjt√
Njt(c)
)
≡ I˜(X=x|C=c)jt = I˜(X=x|C=c)kt ≡ PktQ˜(X=x|C=c)kt
(
σBkt√
Nkt(c)
)
. (2)
We continue our reformulation of bet invariance conditional on C, omitting the formal dependence
on C where it does not cause confusion.
Second, we relax bet invariance to account for the fact that, in practice, the link between bet vol-
ume and total volume and that between bet volatility and total volatility may vary systematically.
For example, the fraction of total trading volume that is not bet related may be systematically
higher or lower around earnings announcements (or certain days of the week, etc.) than at other
times, and market frictions may be larger or smaller then, as well.7 We control for this by allowing
7“Parasitic” high-frequency trading is another mechanism that may increase this fraction: high-frequency traders
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systematic variation in these market primitives to vary as a function of the bet size quantile x.
Importantly, our formulation is agnostic about the exact nature of any such systematic variation.
We next formally demonstrate the links between bet volume and total volume, and bet volatility
and total volatility, requiring only that bet volume and volatility translate monotonically to total
volume and total volatility, respectively.
We define ζx to be the ratio of total trading volume to bet volume at bet size quantile x.
We capture the ratio of total volatility σjt to bet volatility σ
B
jt by ψ
x ≥ 1, recognizing that total
volatility exceeds bet volatility by (ψx − 1) × 100 percent due to news arrival, market frictions,
etc. For example, price movements due to the arrival of public macro news induce volatility that
speculators may not necessarily be able to bet on.
Our primary identification assumption is that while we allow for variation in these parameters as
a function of the bet size quantile x, we assume that ηx = ζxψx is a common factor across all stocks.
That is, while ηx can vary deterministically in very general ways with bet size quantile x, it does not
vary systematically across stocks. With this identification assumption in hand, we multiply equa-
tion (2) by ηx. Multiplying the two sides of equation (2) by ηx transforms the bet dollar risk transfer
into a function of total dollar volume and total volatility. Hence, we reformulate invariance of bets
from MMI into quantitative properties based on observable total volume and volatility. That is,
PjtQ˜
(X=x)
jt
(
σBjt√
Njt
)
ηx ≡ I˜(X=x)jt ηx = I˜(X=x)kt ηx ≡ PktQ˜(X=x)kt
(
σBkt√
Nkt
)
ηx, (3)
and
PjtQ˜
(X=x)
jt ζ
x
(
ψxσBjt√
Njt
)
≡ I˜(X=x)jt ηx = I˜(X=x)kt ηx ≡ PktQ˜(X=x)kt ζx
(
ψxσBkt√
Nkt
)
. (4)
With bet invariance now stated in total volume and volatility terms, we reformulate bet invari-
ance using a fixed dollar amount traded of a stock, eliminating the need to observe individual bets.
We consider a constant dollar value Sqt for any stock j in a portfolio q of stocks at time t. Because
Q˜jt is stochastic, and bet volume does not represent total volume, we define a random variable A˜jt
who identify institutional order flow remove liquidity in the same direction to profit from providing it at a later
time, adding to the amount of non-bet volume and volatility (CITE CITE CITE).
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such that
Sqt = A˜jtPjtQ˜jtζ. (5)
A˜jt exactly offsets variations in total dollar volume, while ζ scales bet volume, PjtQ˜jt, to total
volume. That is, A˜jt ≡ Sqt
PjtQ˜jtζ
is the random variable that transforms the constant Sqt to the
realized dollar bet size, given ζ. For a fixed bet arrival rate Njt and calendar-time bet volatility σ¯jt,
one can interpret A˜jt as the stochastic time required for dollar volume Sqt to trade in the market:
A˜jt is smaller (the required time is shorter) when trading activity is higher. We only require that ζ
vary deterministically with bet size quantile in such a way (monotonically suffices) as to preserve a
one-to-one mapping between the probability distribution of Q˜jt and the probability distribution of
trading activity (and hence a one-to-one inverse mapping with the probability distribution of A˜jt).
As a result, the xth percentile of dollar bet size corresponds to the 1− xth percentile of A˜jt.
From MMI, implementing dollar bet amount PjtQ˜jt of stock j at time t has a volatility per
bet
σBjt√
Njt
. Equation (4) presents invariance of bets in a form based on total volume and total
volatility, implying that the (generally unobservable) business-time total volatility associated with
trading the rescaled bet value PjtQ˜jtζ is
ψσBjt√
Njt
. This leads us to define the observable trade-time
total volatility associated with realization of Sqt = A˜jtPjtQ˜jtζ at a given quantile A˜
(X=1−x)
jt as
σ˜(Sqt)
(X=x)
jt ≡ A˜(X=1−x)jt
(
ψxσBjt√
Njt
)
. (6)
σ˜(Sqt)
(X=x)
jt represents the total volatility associated with realization of Sqt dollars worth of stock
j’s transactions at bet size quantile Q˜
(X=x)
jt .
2.3 Invariance of Bets and the Cross-section of Total Volatility
We next derive the implications of invariance of bets for the cross-section of trade-time total volatil-
ity. The key step is to translate the distributional properties of risk transfers of unobservable bets
to distributional properties of observable trade-time volatilities (associated with fixed-dollar values
Sqt). Equation (5) at the bet size percentile 1 − x yields PjtQ˜(X=1−x)jt ζ(1−x) =
Sqt
A˜
(X=x)
jt
. Thus, we
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can rewrite the invariance condition, equation (4), as:
Sqt
(
ψ1−xσBjt
A˜
(X=x)
jt
√
Njt
)
≡ I˜jtη(X=1−x) = I˜ktη(X=1−x) ≡ Sqt
(
ψ1−xσBkt
A˜
(X=x)
kt
√
Nkt
)
. (7)
Letting k represent the stock with median bet volatility, we rearrange equation (7) as:A˜(X=x)jt
A˜
(X=x)
med,t
 = ψ1−xσBjt√Nmed,t
ψ1−xσBmed,t
√
Njt
. (8)
Our final step is to multiply both sides of (8) by the right-hand side, so that the left-hand side be-
comes the ratio of observable trade-time volatilities whose general form was defined in equation (6):
( A˜(X=x)jt ψ1−xσBjt√Njt
A˜
(X=x)
med,t
ψ1−xσBmed,t√
Nmed,t
)
=

(
σBjt
)2
(
σBmed,t
)2
(Nmed,t
Njt
)
. (9)
The left-hand side of equation (9) is what we term normalized trade-time volatility (see equation 6),
Y˜
(X)
jt ≡
σ˜(Sqt)
(X)
jt
σ˜(Sqt)
(X)
med,t
=
(
A˜
(X)
jt
A˜
(X)
med,t
)(
σBjt
√
Nmed,t
σBmed,t
√
Njt
)
. (10)
It is the ratio of stock j’s trade-time total volatility to the trade-time total volatility of portfolio
q’s median stock. The right-hand side of equation (9) is a constant that does not vary with X.
Equation (10) demonstrates the implication of MMI’s bet invariance hypothesis for the cross-
sectional distribution of observable trade-time volatilities. Specifically, it implies that the trade-time
total volatilities associated with Sqt at trading activity quantiles (i.e., inverse of A˜jt) x1 and x2
must be identical once one normalizes by the median trade-time volatilities at those quantiles.
We have shown that invariance requires that, for all j and t, Y˜
(X)
jt be constant in X. Thus, we
have that, for distinct activity quantiles x1 and x2,
σ˜(S)
(X=x1)
jt
σ˜(S)
(X=x1)
med,t
≡ Y˜ (X=x1)jt = Y˜ (X=x2)jt ≡
σ˜(S)
(X=x2)
jt
σ˜(S)
(X=x2)
med,t
. (11)
Dividing yields an empirically-testable implication of bet invariance,
Y˜
(X=x1)
jt
Y˜
(X=x2)
jt
= 1, ∀ x1, x2. (12)
We test equation (12) using regression analysis and stock-level observations of Y˜
(X)
jt obtained
at different trading activity conditions. Invariance imposes restrictions not only stock-by-stock,
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but also with other public information trading features (conditioning information) such as activity
level or time-of-day. We extend our formulation to control for time-of-day, denoted d ∈ D (more
generally indexed above by c ∈ C). Invariance imposes that Y˜ (X,D)jt is constant across X and D.
We operationalize the restrictions imposed by invariance by taking natural logs, defining
y˜(X,D)jt ≡ ln(Y˜ (X,D)jt ). (13)
To test the strong form of MMI’s bet invariance proposed by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016), we
estimate
y˜(x, d)jt = α0 + α1y˜(x
′, d′)jt + ujt, (14)
where ujt ∼ N(0, δ), x and x′ index trading activity levels, d and d′ index time-of-day windows,
and (x, d) 6= (x′, d′). This strong form of bet invariance predicts that α0 = 0 and α1 = 1. We also
consider a weaker form of invariance that only imposes that Y˜
(X,D)
jt be constant in X conditional
on D. To test this we estimate
y˜(x, d)jt = α0 + α1y˜(x
′, d)jt + ujt, (15)
where ujt ∼ N(0, δ), x and x′ index trading activity levels, d indexes a particular time-of-day
window, and x 6= x′.8 We next show that the same relationships obtain when profit maximizing
speculators are subject to a no-speculative-arbitrage condition.
2.4 No-specuative-arbitrage and the cross-section of total volatility
In this section, we establish that a general version of equation (11), i.e., the implication of bet in-
variance for the cross-section total volatility, follows from a no-speculative-arbitrage condition. Our
derivation starts out with premises that are complementary but distinct from those underlying MMI.
When speculators identify a profit opportunity they choose trade amounts that maximize expected
profits from speculation. We then impose a no-speculative-arbitrage condition after adjusting for
variations in the arrival rates of such opportunities. No speculative arbitrage and bet invariance
8In Appendix 4.6, we present estimation results given d 6= d′. We find that placing stronger restrictions on how
normalized trade-time volatilities must be related across trading condition environments tend to give rise to stronger
violations of bet invariance predictions.
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yield the same implications for how cross-sections of volatility obtained at different trading condi-
tions must be related. Our development sketches a simple economic mechanism for bet invariance.
No speculative arbitrage is a restriction that says that a speculator should be indifferent as
to which stocks she investigates at a moment in time. The price impact of trade for different
stocks should adjust in equilibrium to deliver this indifference. While an individual speculator
typically only selects among a subset of stocks to investigate, collectively speculators select from
the universe of stocks. This delivers the equal expected profit from investigation condition, i.e. the
no-speculative-arbitrage condition.
Consider a stock j in market activity condition x at time d of the trading day. The maintained
assumption is that if stock j has publicly-known conditional expected value E[vj |(x, d)] ≡ E[vjxd],
then the expected price impact of a trade of size qjxd at that moment takes the familiar linear form
pjxd(qjxd, E[vjxd]) = E[vjxd] + λjxdqjxd,
where the price impact parameter λjxd can vary with the stock j, the market conditions x (e.g.,
because the extent of liquidity provision can vary), and the time of day d (e.g., because informa-
tion arrival can vary). A realized profit opportunity arises when a speculator acquires information
that suggests that the true value of the asset is given by vjxd 6= E[vjxd]. Optimization leads the
speculator to solve
max
qjxd
qjxd(vjxd − pjxd(qjxd, E[vjxd])) = max
qjxd
qjxd(vjxd − E[vjxd]− λjxdqjxd) (16)
Solving the resulting first-order condition yields the standard linear trading outcome:
qjxd =
vjxd − E[vjxd]
2λjxd
.
Substituting for qjxd into (16) yields the realized profit opportunity,
(vjxd − E[vjxd])2
4λjxd
.
From an ex-ante perspective, when deciding which stock to investigate, what matters is the ex-
pected profit that the speculator anticipates from investigation. This hinges on the expected profit
opportunity when one arrives, and the arrival rate of those opportunities.
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The expected profit opportunity for stock j conditioned on market activity condition x at
time-of-day d is just
Ej
[
(vjxd − E[vjxd])2|(x, d)
]
4λjxd
≡ Ej
[
(vjxd − E[vjxd])2
]
4λjxd
≡ σ
2
jxd
4λjxd
. (17)
That is, the expected profit opportunity is given by stock j’s volatility divided by 4 times the price
impact of trade. The arrival rate of profit opportunities for stock j in market activity condition x
at time d is given by βjxd, where the arrival of profit opportunities can again depend on the stock,
level of market activity and time of day. No speculative arbitrage requires that expected profit
opportunities, after adjusting for arrival rates of such opportunities, must be equal across stocks
and market conditions. That is, for a stock k in market activity condition x′ and time-of-day d′
βjxdσ
2
jxd
4λjxd
=
βkx′d′σ
2
kx′d′
4λkx′d′
(18)
To empirically test whether no speculative arbitrage holds at a given time-of-day window, we
make the identifying assumption that the arrival rates of profit opportunities and price impacts
decompose as λjxd = λjλxd and βjxd = βjβxd. That is, there can be heterogeneity in arrival rates of
profit opportunities and price impacts across stocks, the impact of trading activity at a given time
of day is similar across stocks. Thus, this formulation allows for the possibility that the impact of
activity could vary by time of day.
To empirically test the stronger restriction that no speculative arbitrage holds at different
time-of-day windows, we make the stronger identifying assumption that the arrival rates of profit
opportunities and price impacts decompose as λjxd = λjλxλd and βjxd = βjβxβd. That is, the
impact of trading activity is similar across stocks at different times of the day.
To derive a testable notion of the no-speculative-arbitrage condition at a given time of day, we
first observe that it must hold for all stocks including the median stock M in some portfolio q, at
any two distinct market activity levels. That is,
βMβxdσ
2
Mxd
4λMλxd
=
βMβx′dσ
2
Mx′d
4λMλx′d
. (19)
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Dividing (18) by (19) yields:
βjσ
2
jxd
λj
βMσ
2
Mxd
λM
=
βkσ
2
kx′d
λk
βMσ
2
Mx′d
λM
(20)
Substituting for j = k and using x 6= x′, and cancelling the common terms on both sides yields the
implication of no speculative arbitrage:
σ2jxd
σ2Mxd
=
σ2jx′d
σ2Mx′d
, (21)
a general version of equation (11). Our argument shows that with no speculative arbitrage, the
cross-section of volatilities relative to the volatility of a benchmark asset, e.g, the asset with median
volatility, should not vary across trading conditions. This result is identical to the implication of
bet invariance about trade-time volatilities associated with realizations of a fixed dollar volume; we
will empirically test this using equation (15) within a given time-of-day window.
With the stronger maintained identifying assumption of separability across stock, activity and
time of day, no speculative arbitrage implies
σ2jxd
σ2Mxd
=
σ2jx′d′
σ2Mx′d′
(22)
for (x, d) 6= (x′d′), allowing for tests using activity levels from different times in the trading day.
This is a much more demanding notion, both because the maintained identifying assumption is
stronger and because it says that speculators can somehow arbitrage intertemporally.
3 Aggregation method and data
3.1 Trade time and normalized trade-time volatility
Our test of bet invariance takes as inputs estimates of volatility that realize as a fixed dollar value
Sqt is traded (see equations (5)–(15)). We now develop empirical counterparts to y˜(x, d)jt, the log
of normalized trade volatility, for a given stock (i), on a given day (t), at a given activity level (x),
at a given time of day (d). For each stock, we must first identify trade sequences of fixed-dollar
values. We follow the approach suggested by Barardehi, Bernhardt, and Davies (2019).9 Each year,
9Motivated by features of trading in modern markets, Gourie`roux et al. (1999) and Easley et al. (2012), among
others, employ similar techniques that aggregate trade information.
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we number transactions in stock j sequentially, using index nj . For transaction nj , we use τj(nj),
Qj(nj), and Pj(nj) to denote respectively, (i) its time measured in seconds from the beginning of the
year, (ii) its size (in shares), and (iii) the corresponding mid-point of best bid and best ask prices.
A trade sequence consists of consecutive transactions that have an aggregate dollar value of
at least Sqt for each stock in size group q in month t. Thus, a shorter time duration indicates
higher trading activity. The first trade sequence begins with the first trade of the year, and each
subsequent trade sequence begins with the first trade following the previous sequence.
Formally, we iteratively solve for the last trade of the kth trade sequence, k = {1, 2, 3, . . .}, as:
nkj = argmin
n∗

n∗∑
n=nk−1j +1
PCj (n)×Qj(n)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
n∗∑
n=nk−1j +1
PCj (n)×Qj(n) ≥ Sqt
 , (23)
where n0j = 0 and the value of aggregate trades is measured using the previous day’s closing price,
PCj (nj).
10 Using the previous day’s closing price to calculate dollar volumes prevents contempora-
neous price movements from affecting identification of trade sequences.11 We construct trade se-
quences that span two trading days, but exclude them from the analysis. Calculating overnight trade
sequences and then excluding them, (1) delivers a random starting point for the first trade sequence
of a given day, precluding any systematic bias; (2) circumvents issues associated with overnight price
adjustments or information arrival;12 and (3) avoids combining trading activity levels from near
close with those just after open, which typically differ.13 Figure 1 illustrates a typical pattern.
For stock j, the time duration of the kth trade sequence (i.e., the inverse of trading activity) is,
durjk = τj(n
k
j )− τj(nk−1j + 1). (24)
To compute the trade-time volatility in basis points of this trade sequence, we follow the approach
suggested by Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2010) to measure spot volatility and use the square
root of the sum of trade-by-trade squared mid-quote price returns, where the quoted prices are the
10The last quoted bid-ask midpoint is used when the closing price is not available.
11Using the previous day’s closing price avoids introducing biases driven by contemporaneous price movements.
For example, with rapidly increasing prices, using that day’s prices can give rise to non-trivially growing dollar
volumes, causing a downward bias in the time duration of the corresponding trade sequence.
12For instance, we do not need to adjust Qj(·) and Pj(·) for stock splits or dividend distributions.
13Excluding overnight trade sequences drops observations that mix realized volatility from very different trading
conditions at close and open of successive trading days. This gives invariance a better chance to succeed in the data.
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Figure 1: Illustration of trade sequence construction. Panel A presents the dollar volume for a
representative mid-sized stock, Acuity Brands Inc. (AYI) on September 22, 2011 over a two hour period.
Panel B shows how we aggregate trades into a trade sequence until cumulative dollar volume Sqt is reached.
As dollar volumes vary over time in Panel A, durations of the associated trade sequence vary in Panel B.
Panel C shows evolutions of quoted price mid-point associated with transactions.
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prevailing quotes across all trading venues at the time of each transaction. That is,
σjk =
√√√√√√ n
k
j∑
n=nk−1j +1
(
Pj(n+ 1)
Pj(n)
− 1
)2
× 10, 000. (25)
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We exclude a trade-by-trade return observation if it exceeds 10% in absolute value. This filter iden-
tifies and removes instances of data entry error. This filter matters: a preliminary draft failed to
account directly for such data entry errors, which led to a small group of extreme normalized trade-
time volatility observations, necessitating a second layer of empirical analysis to account for them.
We next describe how we construct the empirical counterparts of the normalized trade-time
volatilities y˜(x, d)jt (see equation(15)) used in our test of invariance. To begin, we create portfolios
of small, mid-sized, and large stocks. Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each year after
excluding the largest 30 stocks based on market capitalization at the close of the final trading day
of the previous year.14 The next largest 400 stocks form our portfolio of large stocks, the following
400 stocks form the portfolio of mid-sized stocks, and those with market-cap rankings between
831–1230 form the portfolio of small stocks. Thus, each size portfolio q ∈ {s,m, l} contains 400
stocks. Working with such relatively liquid stocks assures that our findings do not reflect liquid vs.
illiquid stock phenomena.
Each month we fix a target dollar value Sqt for all stocks in a size portfolio q. The target dollar
value is 0.03% of median market capitalization of the stocks in the portfolio at the end of the previ-
ous month. This means that we use a total of 3×12×13 = 468 target dollar values over our 13-year
sample period, 2005–2017, or one for each size portfolio by month by year grouping. The average
target dollar values for portfolios of large, mid-sized, and small stocks are $3.098 million, $0.675
million, and $0.174 million, respectively. Table 1 shows the evolution of the quartile statistics of
time durations of trade sequence that correspond to Sqt fixed dollar-values vary over the years in
our sample. A typical trade-time observation is 12-30 minutes long, trading off having enough
observations to assess intra-daily variations in trading conditions, while still being large enough to
avoid the positive autocorrelation associated with dynamic order splitting. In untabulated results,
we find that the mean autocorrelation in returns across successive trade sequences is insignificantly
different from zero.
14We exclude these very large stocks due to the huge variation in their market capitalizations and trading volumes;
this heterogeneity means that a fixed targeted dollar value for this group of stocks would be either too small for
the largest in the group or too large for smallest stocks in the group. See Ijiri and Simon (1977), Axtell (2001), or
Gabaix and Landier (2008) for work on the power law in firm size.
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Table 1: Cross-stock-month averages of stock–specific quartile statistics of trade-time
measures associated with 0.03% of median market-capitalization by size portfolio and
year. Trade-time measures, in minutes, of Sqt are calculated for each stock. First quartiles, me-
dians, and third quartiles of durjk are calculated for each stock in each month. Cross-stock-month
averages of the quartile statistics are reported by stock market-capitalization portfolio and year.
Year
Portfolio Statistic 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Large
1st Quartile 16.9 15.9 11.6 8.3 7.5 8.2 8.6 9.5 10.3 10.7 10.7 10.2 11.7
Median 26.9 24.7 18.7 13.3 13.0 14.7 15.2 16.9 18.6 19.0 18.8 18.4 21.4
3rd Quartile 40.2 36.4 28.0 20.1 20.4 23.4 24.2 26.5 29.4 29.7 29.1 28.7 33.3
Mid-sized
1st Quartile 15.8 14.0 11.2 8.3 9.1 9.5 9.0 9.8 10.2 9.3 9.2 9.4 10.2
Median 26.5 23.8 18.9 14.3 16.7 18.3 17.7 19.4 20.8 19.0 18.6 19.1 21.9
3rd Quartile 40.8 36.7 29.8 22.7 27.3 30.6 30.1 32.7 35.6 32.1 31.1 32.2 37.7
Small
1st Quartile 18.8 16.4 11.9 12.5 14.2 16.4 16.9 21.4 19.6 14.6 15.1 19.7 21.3
Median 32.1 28.6 21.7 23.2 27.2 32.5 34.9 41.9 39.1 30.5 30.9 37.4 41.3
3rd Quartile 50.4 45.1 35.7 38.7 46.5 55.3 60.5 70.9 66.6 52.7 53.8 61.7 69.4
We assign each trade sequence to one of fifteen time-of-day/activity level categories, first de-
composing the trading day into three time-of-day windows, {9:30AM–11:15AM (d = 1), 11:15AM–
2:15PM (d = 2), 2:25PM–4:00PM (d = 3)}, and then sorting trade sequences within a time-of-day
window into quintiles of trading activity. A trade sequence is assigned to a time-of-day window
according to the window containing the mid-point of the trade sequence. For example, a trade se-
quence beginning at 11:13AM and ending at 11:19AM is assigned to time window d = 2. All trade
sequences within a month and time of day window are assigned to quintiles of trading activity–trade
sequences with shorter time duration feature higher trading activity. These sorts assure an equal
number of observations across different activity levels in each time-of-day window of a stock and
allow us to control for fixed month effects.
The final step is to calculate the normalized mean trade-time volatility for stock j in month t:
σ¯(x, d)jt is stock j’s mean trade-time volatility, obtained by averaging σ
j
k (equation (25), above)
across stock j’s trade sequences, in month t at trading activity level x and time-of-day d. The
cross-stock median of σ¯(x, d)jt in month t for stocks j in portfolio q is denoted σ¯(x, d)
q
med,t. Our
empirical analysis focuses on normalized mean trade-time volatility,
y¯(x, d)jt ≡ ln
(
σ¯(x, d)jt
σ¯(x, d)qmed,t
)
with j ∈ q. (26)
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Normalizing by month and trading condition controls for systematic variation including common
time fixed effects. We will show that it controls for the systematic variation in trade-time volatil-
ity by time of day and trading activity documented by Barardehi and Bernhardt (2019), and for
any common variation in microstructure environments (i.e., in microstructure noise) across trading
conditions. Controlling for these factors ensures that we are testing “bet invariance,” as delineated
in the Market Microstructure Invariance hypothesis in Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016) and as derived
in our no-speculative-arbitrage conditions, above, rather than picking up microstructure noise or
patterns in volatility associated with trading conditions.15
3.2 Data
We focus on the largest U.S.-based NYSE-listed common stocks by market capitalization (CRSP
share codes 10 and 11) in our January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2017 sample period. We exclude
stocks that do not maintain a minimum daily closing price of $1 over the course of a year. Our sam-
ple consists of stocks that feature the necessary identifying information to match with TAQ data.
We first use NCUSP from CRSP and CUSIP from TAQ to match data across the two databases; for
the stocks without such links, we use TSYMBOL from CRSP and SYMBOL from TAQ to match
data. Remaining unmatched stocks are dropped from the sample. As described above, we then
drop the 30 largest stocks, and split the next 1200 stocks into subsamples of 400 small, medium,
and large stocks. Each month, market-capitalizations are defined as the product of CRSP closing
prices and corresponding number of shares outstanding at the end of the previous month.
Transaction quantities and time stamps are obtained from the consolidated trade history in the
NYSE TAQ database. We consider all stock trades on all U.S.-based trading venues, including
those regulated by FINRA, during regular market hours between 9:30AM and 4:00PM (EST). We
construct National Best Bid and National Best Offer prices at the time of each transaction from
the consolidated quotes history and NBBO files in the TAQ database, and match each transaction
with the corresponding mid-point price.16
15Our findings are unaffected by the benchmark used for normalization. In untabulated robustness analyses, identi-
cal findings obtain when, instead of the stock with month-specific median volatility, we normalize trade-time volatili-
ties with respect to the volatility of the stock that is at the first or the third quartile of a given monthly cross-section.
16We use a modified version of the SAS code available on Professor Craig Holden’s website
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4 Cross-section of trade-time volatility
In this section, we conduct our test of bet invariance (no-speculative-arbitrage) in the cross-section
of trade-time volatilities. We first establish that normalization by the median stock in each sam-
ple eliminates all economically meaningful time-of-day patterns in realized normalized trade-time
volatilities. We first regress these realized volatilities on realized volatilities across trading activity
levels, and find substantial departures from the central prediction of bet invariance. Analysis of
these departures reveals a systematic relationship: departures grow larger when comparing less
active to more active markets, and the corresponding goodness of fit in these regressions weak-
ens. Because, the notion of no speculative arbitrage is an ex-ante concept—a speculator’s decision
about which asset to investigate depends on the expected profit they anticipate from investigation—
realized volatilities, as independent variables, possess noise that biases coefficients downward. To
correct for this, we next decompose volatilities on the right-hand sides of our invariance regressions
into expected and unexpected volatilities. This corrected analysis provides strong support for bet
invariance, revealing that the initial departures were largely driven by unexpected cross-sectional
variation in realized volatilites.
4.1 Time-of-day effects in the cross-section of trade-time volatility
We first show that normalizing trade-time volatilities with respect to a benchmark stock—the stock
with median volatility—controls for level effects of trading activity and time-of-day on trade-time
volatility.17. This normalization avoids conflating variation driven by level effects with the relative
cross-sectional differences in profit opportunities associated with bet invariance.
Figure 2 contrasts the cross-sections of log actual trade-time volatilities with those of normalized
trade-time volatilities. The top panel plots quartile statistics averaged over months of log actual
trade-time volatilities for different time-of-day windows and trading activity levels. The figure
shows that actual trade-time volatility drops over the trading day and also with trading activity.
In contrast, the bottom panel reveals that normalized trade-time volatilities, y¯(x, d)jt, do not mean-
(https://kelley.iu.edu/cholden/) to construct best quoted prices and match midpoints with transactions.
17See Barardehi and Bernhardt (2019) for a discussion of these patterns.
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Figure 2: Cross-section of trade-time volatility by size portfolio. For each market-cap category
in each month medians, 25th percentiles, and 75th percentiles of trade-time volatility (ln(σ¯(x, d)jt) and
the normalized trade-time volatility (y¯(x, d)jt) are calculated. Averages of the three statistics are obtained
by time-of-day window d and trading activity level x across the 48 months of data. Market-capitalization
portfolios are formed at the beginning of the year.
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ingfully vary with trading activity or time of day—normalization removes almost all of the level
effects associated with different trading conditions. Indeed, the cross-stock medians across trading
activity levels and time of day are virtually identical, and the other quartile statistics display only
modest variation as activity rises.
4.2 Preliminary test of bet invariance
We now test the less demanding form of bet invariance as posited by KO and as formulated above
in our no-speculative-arbitrage conditions. To do so, we estimate the linear association between
normalized mean trade-time volatility at a given time-of-day and activity level, from equation (26),
and that in all other activity levels in the same time-of-day window. That is, we estimate
y¯(x, d)jt = α0 + α1y¯(x
′, d)jt + ujt with ujt ∼ N(0, δ), (27)
for x, x′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and d ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
With five activity levels, indexed by x 6= x′, and three time-of-day windows, indexed by d, there
are a total of (5 × 4) × 3 = 60 ordered pairs of dependent and independent variables, reflecting
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5×4
2 ×3 = 30 distinct unordered pairs of trading activity levels, accounting for different time-of-day,
for equation (27). For each stock size category q, we estimate equation (27) for each of these 60
pairs using a Fama-MacBeth approach.18 We then investigate estimated α1 coefficient magnitudes
and their statistical significance, and formally test the prediction of bet invariance, H0 : α1 = 1,
each time we estimate equation (27).
Figure 3 shows that, at a first glance, the data do not provide overwhelming support for the
prediction of bet invariance. The top row presents histograms for αˆ1. The histograms indicate that
most point estimates fall below one: point estimates range between 0.68 and 1.04, and they tend to
fall further below for smaller and mid-sized stocks.19 The middle row shows the histograms of the
corresponding t-statistics that test the null of H0 : α1 = 1. The overwhelming majority of estimates
are statistically different from one (most estimates are less than one, and over 80% of the t-statistics
exceed 4 in absolute value, with over 95% exceeding 2). Of course, when we formally test the hypoth-
esis H0 : α1 = 1, we reject the null most of the time—but these differences are not quantitatively
large. Invariance also predicts that α0 = 0. Consistent with this, we find that the economic magni-
tudes of α0 estimates are negligible in magnitude, varying between −0.027 and 0.025, even though
nearly half of these estimates are statistically different from zero and only 20% of estimates have
t-statistics that exceed 4 in absolute value. The bottom row in Figure 3 shows that for all size port-
folios and in all years, equation (27) fits the data well, with most R2 magnitudes exceeding 80%. Our
initial findings do not support the theory of bet invariance or a no-speculative-arbitrage condition.
We examine all 60 ordered pairs of normalized trade-time volatility that one can choose from
the five trading activity levels, within different three time-of-day windows. While there are only 30
distinct unordered such pair sets, theory does not specify the choice of dependent and independent
variables in the regression analysis. We next show that this choice matters, as it explains the
magnitudes of violations of bet invariance.
18We display Newey-West standard errors.
19This of course refers to smaller (rank 701–1000) stocks within the largest 1000 stocks.
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Figure 3: Empirical distributions of αˆ1s, t(H0 : α1 = 1)s, and R2s by stock size category. For
each market-cap category, equation (27) is estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the 60 possible
pairs of normalized mean trade-time volatilities at different time-of-day windows and activity levels (y¯(x, d)
and y¯(x′, d)). The top row presents the empirical distributions of αˆ1 point estimates. The middle row
presents the empirical distributions of corresponding t-statistics for H0 : α1 = 1, with vertical dashed lines
indicating t = −4 and t = 4. The bottom row presents the empirical distributions of R2s.
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4.3 Trading activity level and the goodness of fit
We next explore the magnitude of departures from bet invariance, i.e., the amount by which α1
estimates differ from unity (shown in Figure 3). We begin by examining the association between
departures from bet invariance and measures of goodness of fit for equation (27). We then relate
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these associations to the levels of trading activity that underlie pair sets of normalized trade-time
volatility entering our tests.
Figure 4: Co-variation between αˆ1 and R2 by trading activity levels. For each market-cap category,
equation (27) is estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the 60 possible pairs of normalized mean
trade-time volatilities at different time-of-day windows and activity levels (y¯(x, d) and y¯(x′, d)). The figures
present the correspondence between αˆ1 and R
2 from the fit based on each pair. Shapes are color-coded to
gray and black to identify y¯(x, d) and y¯(x′, d) pairs with x > x′ and x < x′, respectively. Trading activity
levels x, x′ ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} are reflected by symbols { + , 4 ,  , ◦ }, respectively.
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Figure 4 illustrates two important findings. First, it shows that estimates of αˆ1 from equa-
tion (27) tend to be smaller when R2 is smaller. As shown by the data points in Figure 4, R2 is far
smaller when higher trading activity levels x or x′ underlie trade-time volatilities used as inputs.
Second, for portfolios of small and mid-sized stocks, this effect is shown predominantly in one sub-
sample of ordered activity level ordered pairs: when x > x′, i.e., when the independent variable
corresponds to the less active market condition, αˆ1’s vary minimally with R
2 as x rises and are all
close to one; in contrast, for x < x′, αˆ1 estimates fall sharply along with their corresponding R2’s as
x′ rises, especially when x′ corresponds to the most active market conditions. This pattern inten-
sifies going from the portfolio of mid-sized firms to that of small firms. In other words, departures
from bet invariance tend to reflect situations where the level of trading activity x′ that underlies
normalized trade-time volaltilities entering the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (27) is higher.
These results are consistent with idiosyncratic components driving more of the cross-sectional
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variation in volatilities in more active markets. For example, such idiosyncratic variation in volatil-
ities can reflect public information news arrival that drives price movements and market activity.
Such increased idiosyncratic variation should naturally reduce measures of goodness of fit. That
is, when high idiosyncratic variation enters a RHS measure of volatility, it biases estimates of α1
downward, as they are a component of volatility that is not orthogonal to expected speculative
profit opportunities. These patterns are weaker for the portfolio of large stocks, where α1 coef-
ficients are closer to one, R2s are higher, and trade-time volatilities obtained at higher trading
activities tend to produce smaller αˆ1 coefficients regardless of the relationship between x and x
′.
This result suggests that idiosyncratic variation is relatively greater for smaller, less actively traded
and followed, stocks. We next show support for this conjecture by splitting the cross-sectional
variation in volatility into systematic and idiosyncratic components.
4.4 Reconsidering expected profit opportunities
Bet invariance, in our setting, delineates a no-speculative-arbitrage condition in the following way:
the profit opportunities from speculation in a given asset, relative to those in a benchmark asset,
e.g., the median stock, should be constant across trading conditions. With free entry, speculators
arbitrage away any differences across trading conditions. This interpretation does not preclude large
realized differences between profit opportunities across stocks due to unanticipated shocks or public
information arrival that may increase or reduce volatility, that result in deviations from predictions
of bet invariance. The distinction between expected versus realized profit opportunities is partic-
ularly important because of our empirical design. Our monthly estimates of trade-time volatility
measure spot volatility (see equation (25)); and spot volatility is sensitive to high-frequency, e.g.,
intraday, price fluctuations. Thus, normalized trade-time volatilities can vary due to unanticipated
information- or liquidity-driven price movements that do not enter the ex-ante considerations of
speculators, as they are unlikely to be exploitable by speculators.
To obtain a better measure of expected profit opportunities, we now decompose the cross-
sectional variation in trade-time volatility at a given trading activity level and time-of-day window
into expected vs. unexpected volatilities. Expected variations in trade-time volatility proxy the dif-
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ferences in expected profit opportunities that speculators ex ante consider when allocating resources
to acquire information about fundamental values in the universe of assets. Realized cross-stock vari-
ation in normalized trade-time (spot) volatility captures both public information arrival from which
speculators cannot profit, and potentially unexpected variation in profit opportunities. This unex-
pected component is an individual stock’s improved or worsened speculation opportunities, relative
to a benchmark asset. In sum, the normalized trade-time (spot) volatilities that the econometri-
cian uses measures with noise the true relative expected profit opportunities that enter speculator
decision-making and the no-speculative arbitrage condition, especially true in active market condi-
tions. To address this, we now estimate expected profit opportunities over time to reduce the noise
in our measure.
To integrate this theoretically, we take expectations over time of the two sides of the invariance
relation, equation (11):
ln
(
Y˜
(x,d)
jt
)
= ln
(
Y˜
(x′,d′)
jt
)
⇒ Et
[
ln
(
Y˜
(x,d)
jt
)]
= Et
[
ln
(
Y˜
(x′,d′)
jt
)]
. (28)
We implement this empirically by using the mean of the previous 24 months of spot trade-time
volatilities as an estimate of Et
[
ln
(
Y˜
(x,d)
jt
)]
.
Assuming an additive error structure for the LHS of equation (28), we have
ln
(
Y˜
(x,d)
jt
)
+ U
(x,d)
jt = Et
[
ln
(
Y˜
(x′,d′)
jt
)]
. (29)
Thus,
ln
(
Y˜
(x,d)
jt
)
= Et
[
ln
(
Y˜
(x′,d′)
jt
)]
− U (x,d)jt , (30)
where U
(x,d)
jt is a mean-zero random innovation.
We posit that the departures documented in Figure 3 reflect the distinction between expected
profit opportunities that speculators pursue ex ante vs. an unpredictable component that does not
enter a speculator’s decision making.
4.5 Bet invariance of expected speculative opportunities
To empirically capture the two sources of cross-stock variation in profit opportunities to speculation,
we decompose equation (27)’s RHS trade-time volatility into expected vs. unexpected components.
27
We use each stock’s average normalized trade-time volatility over the previous 24 months (or the
longest time-series available within the 24 months) to proxy for expected volatilities. The differ-
ence between the realized and expected volatilities captures unexpected volatility. That is, expected
trade-time volatility is
y¯(x′, d)Ejt =
1
Ljt
t−1∑
m=t−25
y¯(x′, d)jm, (31)
where Ljt is the number of y¯(x
′, d)jm observations between months t−1 ≤ m ≤ t−25. Accordingly,
unexpected volatility is given by
y¯(x′, d)Ujt = y¯(x
′, d)jt − y¯(x′, d)Ejt. (32)
We operationalize an empirical test of equation (30) by replacing the RHS variable in equation (27)
with y¯(x′, d)Ejt and y¯(x
′, d)Ujt, separately, to investigate bet invariance by examining the cross-stock
distributions of expected vs. unexpected normalized volatilities, respectively.
We now show that the prediction of bet invariance is largely retrieved when we use expected
normalized trade-time volatilities as the independent variable in our bet invariance regression. We
establish that the departures from the implications of bet invariance are almost entirely driven by
unexpected variation in the cross-section of trade-time volatilities. We estimate
y¯(x, d)jt = α
E
0 + α
E
1 y¯(x
′, d)Ejt + u
E
jt with u
E
jt ∼ N(0, δ), (33)
for x, x′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and d ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and
y¯(x, d)jt = α
U
0 + α
U
1 y¯(x
′, d)Ujt + u
U
jt with u
U
jt ∼ N(0, δ), (34)
for x, x′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and d ∈ {1, 2, 3},
maintaining the estimation approach used to fit equation (27).
Figure 5 illustrates support for bet invariance when we substitute expected volatilities for re-
alized volatilities on the right-hand side of the invariance regressions. Compared to Figure 3, the
histograms of the slope coefficients, αE1 , display visibly denser concentrations near 1 for all stock
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Figure 5: Empirical distributions of αˆE1 s and t(H0 : α
E
1 = 1)s. For each market-cap category,
equation (33) is estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the 60 possible pairs of normalized mean
trade-time volatilities across different time-of-day windows and at different activity levels, (y¯(x, d) and
y¯(x′, d)). The top row presents the empirical distributions of αˆ1 point estimates. The bottom row presents
the empirical distributions of corresponding t-statistics for H0 : α1 = 1, with vertical dashed lines indicating
t = −4 and t = 4.
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size portfolios. Point estimates now range between 0.81 and 1.09, indicating an upward density
shift relative to those shown in Figure 3. Moreover, the t-statistics testing the null H0 : α
E
1 = 1
are far more concentrated around zero than those for H0 : α1 = 1 as in our previous tests. Only
29% of t-statistics exceed 4 in absolute value, with just over 60% exceeding 2. As a result, one
cannot reject the prediction of bet invariance in most cases when we use this improved measure of
expected profit opportunities.
Moreover, the use of expected volatilities as the right-and side variable in invariance regressions
largely eliminates the association between deviations from bet invariance and measures of goodness
of fit. Figure 6 plots αE1 estimates against the corresponding R
2 measures. The patterns reinforce
our premise that deviations from the prediction of bet invariance found using normalized spot
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volatilities reflect that these normalized spot volatilities are noisy measures of expected volatilities.
Once much of the measurement error is removed, not only do the slope coefficients shift upward,
but the association between departures from invarance and R2 measures of invariance regressions
largely vanish, especially for mid-sized and large stocks.20
Figure 6: Co-variation between αˆE1 and R
2 by trading activity levels. For each market-cap category,
equation (33) is estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the 60 possible pairs of normalized mean
trade-time volatilities at different time-of-day windows and activity levels (y¯(x, d) and y¯(x′, d)). The figures
present the correspondence between αˆE1 and R
2 from the fit based on each pair. Shapes are color-coded to
gray and black to identify y¯(x, d) and y¯(x′, d)E pairs with x > x′ and x < x′, respectively. Trading activity
levels x, x′ ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} are reflected by symbols { + , 4 ,  , ◦ }, respectively.
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We conclude our analysis by providing more direct evidence that the deviations from bet invari-
ance are driven by realizations of unexpected components of realized normalized volatilities. To do
this, we establish the strict stochastic dominance of the distributions of αˆU1 with respect to those
of αˆE1 . Figure 7 demonstrates this graphically: cumulative densities of αˆ
U
1 substantially exceed
those of αˆE1 for all values of α1 estimates. Averages of αˆ
U
1 for portfolios of large, mid-sized, and
small firms are 0.73, 0.78, and 0.75 respectively; whereas the counterparts for αˆE1 are 0.95, 0.96,
and 0.96, demonstrating the fundamental effect of unexpected variation in volatility in driving the
departures from bet invariance.
20The R2 measures in Figure 6 are 20-30 percentage points less than their counterparts in Figure 4. These differ-
ences reflect that equations (33) and (27) share the same dependent variable, but the variation in the independent
variable of equation (33) is smaller. In fact, y¯(x′, d)jt = y¯(x′, d)Ejt + y¯(x
′, d)Ujt, and y¯(x
′, d)Ujt has a mean of zero.
Thus, the numerator of the R2 statistic for equation (33) is, by construction, smaller than that for equation (27),
while the denominators are the same.
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Figure 7: Cumulative densities of αˆU1 and αˆ
E
1 . For each market-cap category, equations (33) and (34)
are estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the 60 possible pairs of normalized mean trade-time
volatilities at different time-of-day windows and activity levels. For each size portfolio, the cumulative
density distributions are plotted.
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4.6 Bet invariance of expected speculative opportunities across time-of-day
We now extend our analysis to investigate whether there are abnormal profit opportunities across
time-of-day. To do this, we must make the stronger identifying assumption that λjxd = λjλxλd
and βjxd = βjβxβd (see equation (18)). We use normalized volatilities obtained from different
time-of-day windows, estimating
y¯(x, d)jt = α
E
0 + α
E
1 y¯(x
′, d′)Ejt + u
E
jt with u
E
jt ∼ N(0, δ), (35)
for x, x′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and d, d′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
This specification is the same as that in equation (33), save that x and x′, indexing trading activity
levels, may or may not be equal, and d 6= d′ index time of day. With three times of day and five
activity levels and the restriction that time of day must differ on the two sides of equation (35),
we have a total of (3 × 5) × (2 × 5) = 150 regressions. Figure 8 shows that using expected trade-
time volatilities as independent variables when testing the stronger form of bet invariance does not
retrieve the unit coefficient prediction of no speculative arbitrage. To the contrary, αE1 estimates
given different time-of-day display larger dispersion than those obtained within time-of-day.
That predictions of a stronger form of bet invariance are not supported by the data suggests
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Figure 8: Cumulative densities of αˆE1 for d = d
′ vs. d 6= d′. For each market-cap category, equa-
tions (33) and (35) are estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the, respectively, 60 and 150 possible
pairs of normalized mean trade-time volatilities at different time-of-day windows and activity levels. For
each size portfolio, the cumulative density functions of αˆE1 obtained from the two specifications are plotted.
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that speculative arbitrage may not be carried out across different times of the trading day. We
provide supportive evidence of this by conditioning αE1 estimates on the distance between the time-
of-day windows underlying the respective LHS and RHS normalized volatility measures. That is,
we condition estimates according to whether or not both LHS and RHS volatilities in our tests
represent early or late trading hours. In this way, we isolate LHS and RHS combinations that
represent the largest time-of-day disparities. Figure 9 shows that the greatest departures from
αE1 = 1 are present in cases in which the equation (35) LHS is from early in the day and the RHS
is from late in the day. Furthermore, the greatest dispersion in estimates is found when including
midday volatilities on either side of the regression. This provides further evidence that speculative
arbitrage may be more effective within a smaller interval of time.
Analysis in Section 4.5 revealed that expected normalized trade-time volatilities at a given time
of the day are roughly equal regardless of the activity level, consistent with the implication of
no-speculative arbitrage. That is, at any given time in the trading day, speculators adjust their
resource allocation to deliver roughly an invariant distribution of expected returns to speculation
across stocks. Also recall that our test of bet invariance jointly tests the identifying restrictions
imposed on price impacts (λ) and the arrival rates of speculative profit opportunities (β). As
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Figure 9: Cumulative densities of αˆE1 when or d = 1 and d
′ = 3 vs. d = 3 and d′ = 1. For each market-
cap category, equation (35) is estimated using a Fama-MacBeth approach given the 150 possible pairs of nor-
malized mean trade-time volatilities at different time-of-day windows and activity levels. For each size portfo-
lio, the cumulative density functions of αˆE1 obtained given d = 1 and d
′ = 3 vs. d = 3 and d′ = 1 are plotted.
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such, finding empirical support for bet invariance (no speculative arbitrage) within time-of-day
windows indicates the plausibility of our identifying assumptions that the linear price impact of
trade and the arrival rate of profit opportunities decompose as λjxd = λjλxd and βjxd = βjβxd. To
extend bet invariance or our notion of no speculative arbitrage across different times of day requires
stronger identifying restrictions, requiring decomposition across stocks, activity levels and time of
day, λjxd = λjλxλd and βjxd = βjβxβd.
Figure 9 shows that, when d and d′ are from early and late in the day, respectively, coefficient
estimates vary widely from the predicted value of 1. For smaller stocks, within our sample of rel-
atively larger stocks, this is also true when d is late, and d′ is early. Moreover, it indicates that
attenuation bias does not underlie deviations of invariance from one for small stocks: αE1 estimates
substantially exceed one for small stocks when d = 3 and d′ = 1, and any attenuation bias would
only reduce these estimates. Because measurement errors are more likely to affect results for smaller
stocks, this also suggests that attenuation bias is unlikely to drive estimates that are less than one
when d = 1 and d′ = 3. One must still be cautious when interpreting these estimates. Due to
the necessary identifying restrictions for testing across times of day, these findings need not reflect
violations of invariance. It could instead be that either the price impacts or arrival rates of profit
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opportunities feature stock-specific variations across different points in a trading day, or both.
5 Conclusion
This paper builds upon and extends existing market microstructure theories to test whether spec-
ulators arbitrage away abnormal profit opportunities across assets and trading conditions. Our
paper derives testable implications from the Market Microstructure Invariance hypothesis “bet in-
variance,” developed by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016), for the cross-section of volatility that rely
only on publicly-available data. Our test addresses the non-observability of bets by translating
implications for risk transfers of bets into implications for the distribution of observable trade-time
volatilities. Moreover, our framework is less restrictive than previous tests of invariance in that
our formulation allows for heterogeneous arrival of bets and price impacts on stocks, over time and
across trading activity levels. We show that bet invariance implies that the slope of a cross-sectional
regression of normalized trade-time volatilities from one trading condition on those from another
trading condition must equal one. We then show that this prediction is also implied by an intuitive
“no speculative arbitrage” condition that the expected profit from investigating one asset rather
than another must be the same.
We obtain weak support for bet invariance when using realized spot volatilities as inputs. Most
slope coefficients are economically and statistically less than one. We also find evidence of significant
noise in the estimates when the independent variable is associated with high trading activity. When
we instead use expected normalized volatilities, based on the average of the previous 24 months, to
proxy for expected volatility, we find support for the theory. This establishes that departures are
driven by unexpected cross-sectional variations in volatility that bias coefficient estimates down-
ward. However, we do not find supporting evidence from one time of day to another. In sum, we
find strong evidence of the role of speculative trading in equating expected profit opportunities to
speculators across assets and trading conditions, but not across time. Our findings shed light on
the systematic cross-stock patterns of volatility at intraday frequencies.
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